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From 1968-1979, the communist North Vietnam was able to take over both South Vietnam and Cambodia. However, US involvement in Indochina gave cause to the communist victory, with the negative impacts of the civilians and the political nuances this created. In particular, the impact of the war on civilians in the north, south and Cambodia can be seen to cause communist victory by 1 979, particularly exacerbated by IIS intervention . The communist north needed a stable platform to launch its attacks from to win the war.
As such, a united community was needed to launch the multiple guerrilla attacks in the south with complete compliance with total warfare. The strong nationalism helped this, but was particularly helped by the US intervention in the area. The bombing of North Vietnam after 1968, such as Line Backer II under Nixon in 1972, as part of his “madman” theory had the counter intuitive effect of binding the country together. Initially designed to stop supplies from going down the Ho Chi Mini trail, the bombing progressively became more socially oriented under the policy of attrition.
During the period after the Geneva accords bomb shelters had been built in preparation for the bombing. As such, minimal deaths occurred. However, the bombing of industry saw NV become closer in their shared hatred of foreign intervention. This dislike was moved onto the south, believing them as a US puppet. This allowed the north government headed by Pam Van Throng, to conduct the total warfare needed against the IIS pressure and the US government vicariously controlling affairs through Thee.
The mining of Hopping harbor and use of agent blue as an agricultural poison re- enforced these nationalist values, again leading to the result of a happily supported total warfare policy. In this manner, US intervention and its effects on the civilians ultimately lead to the NV having a strong platform to launch attacks. Also important was the foreign aid that the North Vietnamese achieved from the USSR and Mao Godson’s China. This aid allowed the NV to be more technologically efficient, such as the use of SAM to counter attack American bombing raids.
Therefore, while the effect on civilians was a strong part of creating NV strength, foreign aid also played a large part. The strong North Vietnamese platform, coupled with the weakness of the south saw the fall of Saigon on April 20th 1975. The southern weaknesses came from its lack of support by its civilians. In turn caused by the impact of the war on civilians and the weakness of the southern government and institutions such as RAVE. Firstly, the American policy of Americanization was aborted after the ET offensive exposed the credibility gap in the USA resulting in the policy of optimizations.
As a result, the 600,000 US troops at the beginning of 1 968 dwindled steadily until the last troops left in 1973. Throughout this process, the impact on the civilians resulted in a loss of support for Thigh’s government. The policies of attrition and Pacification were still somewhat vainly sought, resulting in many bombs being dropped on South Vietnam, indeed more than the entire ordnance dropped in all of WWW was dropped in Vietnam. These destroyed village’s livelihoods, as agricultural land Was unable due to agent orange or literally blown up.
This resulted in SF having an internal ratio figure of 25%. The policy of attrition thus failed, as the US were pulling out slowly through Optimizations and were actually creating support for NV as the SF peasants did not like being bombed. Pacification similarly failed, as the bombing served only to turn people away from the IIS and Saigon regime. Other incidents, such as My Alai also saw villagers lose support for the SF government, making it easier for the NV to conduct aerial warfare and resulting in an easier victory in the Spring and Ho Chi Mini offensives.
The South’s problems with the legacy of Americanization saw a rise in illegal activities such as prostitution and increasingly apathetic political views, also resulting in a loss of support for the government. With no support, the Saigon regime was unable to effectively wage the war. RAVE soldiers deserted daily, with estimates as high as 3000 a week, and with the civilians supporting the PVC as a result of the impact on civilians, the Saigon regime was unable to militarily defeat the PVC.
Operations such as Lam Son in 971 saw the failures of the RAVE and the policy of Optimizations. Indeed, as Optimizations continued, the southern government contain due to falter. As such, despite continual aid, such as the American supplying SF with the 4th largest air force in the world from 1 973 to 1975, the RAVE was unable to stop the NAVA in the Easter and Ho Chi Mini offensives, due to the lack of support for the southern government caused by the impact of the war on civilians and the ultimate withdrawal of the US and failure of Optimizations.
Thus, the communist north was able to capture Saigon in 1975. CAMBODIA: Para 3 CAMBODIA Similar to North Vietnam, the Indochina War significantly impacted Cambodia Civilians through US bombings of the Ho Chin Mini Trail and PVC sanctuaries, with additional long term affects. These bombings began with General Abraham’s Operation Menu on March 18th 1972, which lasted 14 months and saw 103,000 tones of bombs dropped in Cambodia, resulting in the death of 200,000 civilians in a supposedly uninhabited zone.
Furthermore, US retaliatory air campaigns and the carpet bombing of the Khmer Republic ultimately forced the NIL and Khmer Rouge deeper into the country to avoid military incursions. This in turn led to the imposition of communist ideology on a larger proportion of Cambodia civilians and as a result allowed the Khmer Rouge to gain support and ultimately take power in 1975. Hence the rise of the Khmer Rouge is arguably the most consequential impact of the Indochina War as it led to the development of a regime which would later impose one of the most horrific genocides on its civilian population in the 20th century.
Direct impacts of the war on Cambodia Civilians were largely felt later in the conflict as US bombings only started in 1 972, 7 years after the start of the war. Major impacts such as the rise of the Khmer Rouge were largely long term and felt after the conflict. Similarly, in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge were able to win their civil war on April 3rd, 1975. As a result of the bombing of Cambodia by the US and the political failings of the Loon Noel government, the Khmer rouge took power.
Bombing of Cambodia in search of retreating PVC encouraged people to join the Khmer Rouge and thus contributed to communist victory. Cambodia had much the same spirit as Vietnam, in terms of nationalism, thus many turned to the KERR whose party platform was strongly patriotic. The joining of Shannon leistered KERR popularity, and with the Loon Noel government openly pro US, the government lost a lot of peasant support. The withdrawal of the US had a very negative impact on the regime whose spending on the military was twice its GAP.
As such, great support was given to the KERR throughout the civil war between the Loon Noel government and the KERR between 1970-75, despite losing 1/4 of its population. As a result of the impact of the bombing of civilians, but more importantly the nationalist sentiments of the KERR and the weaknesses of Loon No’, the KERR captured Phonon Penn in April 1 975 and declared year O. Over he following years in search of the policy of RAM (Radical Agrarian Marxism) POI pot the leader Of the KERR killed nearly 1/3 Of his own people it is estimated.
The killing fields and other legacies such as Sentential had a horrible impact on the civilians. Using this as justification as well as the border raids which had killed an estimated 50,000 Vietnamese, the newly re-untied Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, reaching Phonon Penn in 1979 and installing their own puppet government in a very short war. In this manner, communism was Victorious by 1979. In conclusion, it can be seen how the effect on civilians played a significant art in North Vietnamese strength and South Vietnamese weaknesses, resulting in communist victory in Saigon in 1975.