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President Franklin Delano Roosevelt hoped to implement this international world order, founded on principles that would uphold the idea of international atomic control and safety. However, his efforts, along with his successor, President Harry Truman, proved to be futile due to the fact that in order for this to occur, the Soviet Union “would have to accept a global system characterized by American political and economic institutions,” (Craig, Radicchio) and as far as Stalin was concerned, this would never come to exist.
The atomic bomb not only proved to be the most powerful and technologically advanced pone of warfare during this era, but it also assumed the role as a tool of negotiation among international affairs, especially while in American hands. Therefore, this attempt at formulating a plan to construct an international control for atomic warfare and postwar peace soon seemed to be America’s way of maintaining sovereignty, and the Soviet Union’s “sun/vial strategy” until it, too, was able to have weapons of mass destruction.
With this growing, yet inconspicuous, plight for sovereignty over international government, which existed in both the U. S. And the U. S. S. R. , the Cold War was inevitable. The authors’ thesis was that the Cold War resulted from ongoing and heightened tension between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II, as well as a failure to consent on international cooperation after the war was over. They instilled this idea throughout the entire book, first, starting with explaining the “Manhattan Project,” and Fad’s atomic wartime diplomacy.
The Manhattan Project was the Presidents mission that served to secretly develop atomic weaponry, which originally would target Germany during World War II. However, the war would soon end, leaving this endeavor to act only as a powerful upper-hand in international negotiations between the Allied Powers. Information regarding atomic warfare and its development would soon be disclosed to the British through agreements reached by Roosevelt and Churchill, but Stalin was purposely left out, which would soon bring about a wave of espionage sparked by his infatuation with the modernization of the Soviet military.
Along with not communicating with Stalin about the atomic bomb, the air of conflict was already instilled due to the prolonged delay and peeing of the second front that Stalin wanted the Americans to provide during W. W. II, and it was not long before both Roosevelt and Stalin were seen as “living in two completely different worlds” (Craig, Radicchio). The writers constantly criticize Roosevelt and Truman along with their administrations for suppressing this information from Stalin, especially when considering that an attempt to form an international world order secured by atomic control was put into place.
However, if the information regarding atomic energy was disclosed to Stalin, who was clearly seen to not share the ideals that Roosevelt and Truman had for this international consensus, America would have lost its ability to bargain with the Soviet Union in forming the international world order through the United Nation’s Atomic Energy Commission. Throughout this book, one cannot help but notice a communist tone that seems to prevail when the efforts and involvement of Stalin are presented to the reader, and it is clear that the work itself is driven by how the individuals portrayed played a part in determining the historical outcome.
For example, in the conclusion, one of the writers emphasizes the prowess Of Joseph Stalin during World War II by simply stating that “Stalin’s political history partook of a kind of survivalist that no American leader could possibly comprehend” (Craig, Radicchio). At the same time, there is also a consistent berating of American officials, especially of Truman, with regards to their actions and responses throughout the trials and tribulations associated with what brought about the war.
The idea that Truman was thrown into becoming President of the most powerful country of the world, and nevertheless during the post-World War II era, extremely unprepared is laid in its own right However, with regards to withholding information about the development of atomic warfare from the Soviet Union, it should not be seen as a negative factor in deducing what could have been the key to succeeding an international world order, because Stalin’s intentions were never to do so!
As for exchanging the info with Britain, regarding the atomic bomb, or “tube alloys,” Roosevelt knew that Great Britain posed no threat against the United States, for they were uninterested in forming their own atomic arsenal with regards to international control because its greatest ally, America, already was doing so. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was under the power of a psychotic and war-driven Joseph Stalin, who would never accept the terms that came along with possible ways of devising this international world order, especially related to the Branch plan. Ultimately, this means that the NUANCE was just a means of delaying a war that was most likely conceived by Roosevelt and Truman, as it was by Stalin, as bound to occur. The Soviet Union was caught in a position where they needed to catch up with America’s progress on atomic development, and this was evident to Truman and his administration because in all of the NUANCE meetings, regardless of what was supposed to be discussed, the atomic bomb and its development always withheld the most gravity and importance for the Soviet representatives.
One can argue that through espionage tactics and the transferring of information over time, the Soviet Union would eventually have their own atomic arsenal, so why not disclose this information in order to maintain a strong relationship and ally? In response to this, one could say that perhaps it was evident to the President that it was too late for consensus with he Soviets, and the release of atomic information without established safeguards would’ve been, in the simplest terms, foolish.
Truman never fully focused on international control, and he knew that the Branch Plan was going to be rejected by Stalin, but it was just a means of maintaining control over the situation for as long as he possibly could, as well as a way of forcing the U. S. S. R. To take blame for the foreseeable failure of the attempt at an international world order. This Truman mindset was portrayed to the reader by the writers through their deduction regarding the bombing of Hiroshima ND Nagasaki.
Surely, it was an immediate solution to end the war in Japan, but it also served as a threat to the Soviet Union, as well as a demonstration of how powerful the atomic bomb truly Was. However, Stalin Was not worried and the writers make a point of saying that Hiroshima did not begin the Cold War. Stalin knew that America was not prepared for another war, but in his mind, it would only take 20 years for it to occur. In conclusion, this book proved to be a thorough examination of the underlying origins of the Cold War with respect to the magnitude of the atomic bomb.
In some instances it was very repetitive regarding the depiction of the atomic “cat-and-mouse” game between the Soviet Union and the United States, but overall it effectively connected ideas and events from the past with those that were currently being examined. Also, there was an excessive amount of speculation regarding the exact thought processes and communication of the individuals that the writers examined, which in a sense took away from the readers ability to relate to the stance which they chose to present this historical material on.