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Schroeder applied for the position of Specialist in errors and International Crime with the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress prior to changing her legal name and presenting as a woman. Schroeder was well qualified for the job, as a graduate of both the National War College and the Army Command and General Staff College holding two masters degrees. Schroeder also served twenty five years of service in the U. S. Armed Forces in many command and staff positions. Before retiring in 2004, Schroeder was a Colonel assigned to the U. S. Special Operations Command.
When Schroeder applied for the position, she had been diagnosed with gender identity disorder and was irking with a licensed clinical social worker to develop a medically appropriate plan for the transition. Schroeder had not presented herself as a woman full time, so she applied with her legal name at the time, “David J. Schroeder. Schroeder was invited for an interview two months after submitting her application, she received the highest interview score of all the candidates. Schroeder went to lunch with Charlotte Price, one of the CARS staff members, intending to inform her of her transsexual.
Schroeder told Price, Price asked some questions and ended lunch stating ‘Well, you’ve given me a lot to think about. I’ll be in touch. ” Following their lunch conversation, Price withdrew her recommendation to hire Schroeder for the position without getting all facts for the position requirements and the transition. 2. Issue – The legal issue that needs examination is that the Library’s decision not to hire Schroeder was sex discrimination banned by Title VII, advancing unlawful discrimination based on her failure to conform with sex stereotypes and that discrimination on the basis of gender identity is literally discriminations “because of… Ex”. 3. Decision -The court decided in effusing to hire Diane Schroeder because her appearance and background did not comport with the decision maker’s sex stereotypes about men and women should act an appear, and in response to Scorcher’s decision to transition, legally, culturally, physically, from male to female, the Library of Congress violated Title Avis’s prohibition on sex discrimination. 4. Reasoning -None of the five asserted legitimate reasons that the Library has given for refusing to hire Schroeder withstands scrutiny. The plaintiffs sex stereotyping theory is grounded in the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterholes v.
Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 251 (1989). The conclusion about a disparate treatment requirement relied heavily on the panel decision in Jeepers v. Hurrah Operating Co. , 392 F. Ad 1076 (9th Cirri. 2004). Affirmed by en banc. Jeepers V. Hurrah Operating Co. , 444 F. Ad 1104, 1109 (9th Cirri. 2006). Scorcher’s case rests on direct evidence, and compelling evidence, that the Library’s hiring decision was infected by sex stereotypes. 6. HARM Implications – A bill that would have banned employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity was introduced in the House of Representatives, see H.
R. 015, 110 Congo. , IS sees. (2007). TWO alternative bills were introduced later, on that banned discrimination only on the basis of sexual orientation, H. R. 3685, 1 10 Congo. , 1st Sees. (2007). And another that banned only gender identity discrimination, H. R. 3686, 110 Congo. , 1st Sees. (2007). B. ) I agree with the District Courts ruling because I believe anyone, regardless man or woman whom believe they have gender identity disorder, can transition accordingly. They have every right to be who they believe they were born and express their true nature the way they perceive to be correct.
I believe every man ND woman are equal and will be treated as such as well. The second case is related to Chapter 15, but we don’t have another assignment. I want you to brief Knox v. SEES. It may be found at: http://www. Supremacist. Gob/opinions/11 PDF / 10-1121c4d6. PDF (20 Points) 1. Facts – In June 2005, respondent, a public sector union (SEES), sent to California employees its annual Hudson notice, setting and capping monthly dues and estimating 56. 35% of its total expenditures in the coming year would be chargeable expenses.
A nonmember had 30 days to object to full payment of dues but would still have to pay the chargeable oration. The union noted that the fund would be used “for a broad range of political expenses, including television and radio advertising, direct mail, voter registration, voter education, and get out the vote activities on our work sites and in our communities across California. ” Petitioners, on behalf of nonunion employees who paid into the fund, brought a class action against the JESSIE alleging violation of their First Amendment rights.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Hudson prescribed a balancing test under which the proper inquiry is whether the Sheik’s procedures reasonably accommodated the interests f the union, the employer, and the non-member employees. 2. IssUe – A legal issue that needs examination that court is presently reviewing is if a public sector union can bill nonmembers for chargeable expenses but may not require them to fund its political or ideological projects. 3. Decision – The Federal District Court granted petitioners summary judgment.
Ruling that the special assessment was for entirely political purposes, it ordered the JESSIE to send a new notice giving class members 45 days to object and to provide those who object a full refund of contributions to the fund. . Reasoning -Under the First Amendment, when a union imposes a special assessment or dues increase levied to meet expenses that were not disclosed when the regular assessment was set, it must provide a fresh notice and may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative consent.
When a State establishes an “agency shop” that exacts compulsory union fees as a condition of public employment, the dissenting employee is forced to support financially an organization with whose principles and demands he may disagree with. 5. Other opinions -Justice Alit delivered he opinion in this case, whether the First Amendment allows a public sector union to require objecting nonmembers to pay a special fee for the purpose of financing the union’s political and ideological activities.
Justice Estimator with Justice Ginsburg concurring in the judgment stating that when a public sector union imposes a special assessment intended to fund solely political lobbying efforts, the First Amendment requires that the union provide nonmembers an opportunity to opt out of the contribution of funds. Justice Brayer with Justice Kananga dissenting. This court held that ‘the Union cannot be faulted for calculating its fee on the basis of its expenses during the preceding year. ” 6.
HARM Implications – When a State establishes an agency shop that exacts compulsory union fees as a condition of public employment, the dissenting employee is forced to support financially. Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U. S. 435. 455. Under California law, public sector employees in a bargaining unit may decide by majority vote to create an agency shop arrangement under which all the employees are represented by a union selected by the majority. Cal. Gobo. Code Ann. 3502. 5(a) (West 2010).
This last case is also really for Chapter 16, but we don’t have another assignment. Want you to brief another recent case, Christopher v. Smithies Became. The case may be found at: http://www. Supremacist. Gob/opinions/11 PDF/1 1-204. PDF. Do all 6 sections. (25) 1. Facts – The petitioners were employed by respondent as pharmaceutical sales representatives for roughly four years, and during that time their primary objective was to obtain nonbinding commitment from physicians to prescribe respondent’s products in appropriate cases.
Each week, petitioners spent about forty hours in the field calling on physicians during normal business ours and in additional ten to twenty hours attending events and performing other miscellaneous tasks. Petitioners were not required to punch a clock or report their hours, and they were subject to only minimal supervision. Petitioners were well compensated for their efforts, and their gross pay included both a base salary and incentive pay. The amount of incentive pay was determined based on the performance of petitioner’s assigned portfolio of drugs in their assigned sales territories.
It is undisputed that petitioners were not paid time and a half wages when they worked more than forty hours per week. . Issue – Petitioners alleged that the respondent violated the FL AS by failing to compensate them overtime. 3. Decision -It was held that the petitioners qualified as outside salesmen under the most reasonable interpretation of the Doll’s regulations. The Ninth Circuit, agreeing that the Doll’s interpretation was not entitled to controlling deference.
Given the interpretation of other disposition it follows that petitioners made sales under the FL AS and thus are exempt outside salesmen within the meaning of the Doll’s regulations. 4. Reasoning – Because the Doll’s interpretation is either entitled to Are deference nor persuasive in its own right, traditional tools of interpretation must be employed to determine whether petitioners are exempt outside salesmen. The FL AS does not furnish a clear answer put provides at least one interpretive clue by exempting anyone employed in the capacity of an outside salesman, 29 U.
S. C. 213(a) (1). Given this interpretation of other disposition it follows that petitioners made sales under the FALLS and thus are exempt outside salesmen within the meaning of the Doll’s regulations. 5. Other opinions – Justice Alit delivered the opinion of the Court, the Fair Labor Standards Act imposes minimum wage and maximum hour’s requirements on employers, but those requirements do not apply to workers employed in the capacity of outside salesmen.
This case required them to decide whether the term outside salesman as defined by the DOLL regulations, encompasses pharmaceutical sales representatives whose primary duty is to obtain nonbinding commitments from physicians to prescribe their employers prescription drugs in appropriate cases. It was concluded that these employees qualify as outside salesmen. Justice Brayer, with Justice Ginsburg, Justice Estimator, and Justice Kananga join, dissenting. That FL AS exempts from federal maximum hour and minimum wage requirements; any employee employed in the capacity of outside salesman.
The question was whether drug company detailer fall within the scope of the term outside salesman, in their view, they do not. 6. HARM Implications – The Fair Labor Standards Act (FALLS) requires employers to pay employees overtime wages, in accordance with 29 S. C. 207(a), but this requirement does not apply with respect to workers employed in the capacity of outside salesman, 213(a)(1 Delegating authority to the Department of Labor (DOLL), to issue regulations to define the terms.